Capitalising on the graph-theoretic account of fibring proposed in [31], we show that fibring preserves the finite model property under mild conditions. Illustrations are provided for modal, deontic, paraconsistent and linear logics.
Introduction
It is well know that in favorable conditions the finite model property (in short fmp) can be used for establishing that a logic is decidable 1 . For this reason, the preservation of fmp by mechanisms for combining logics has been in the foreground of those working on the field. Using the so called surrogates technique [18] , fmp was shown to be preserved by fusion of modal logics. Fusion is a special case of fibring [12] , but the preservation of fmp by fibring in general was not established.
Herein, also using the surrogates technique, we are able to extend this transference result to the fibring of a much wider class of logics by taking advantage of a novel feature of the graph-theoretic semantics of fibring proposed in [31] : every model of the logic obtained by fibring L 1 and L 2 is roughly the Cartesian product of a model of L 1 and a model of L 2 . Previous semantics of fibring [13, 29, 34, 32, 8] did not share this essential ingredient of our proof of the fmp transference. Observe also that the graph-theoretic account of fibring encompasses a much wider universe of logics, including paraconsistency and substructurality, thanks to using an abstraction map from the semantic universe to the language, instead of the traditional interpretation map from the latter to the former.
The reader is expected to be conversant with the concepts and main results of the graph-theoretic account of fibring given in [30, 31] , but for convenience we provide a very brief summary in Section 2, together with a straightforward extension to the case of constrained fibring (allowing the sharing of symbols). Graph-theoretic examples of logics with fmp are given in Section 3. The main result is proved in Section 4 and illustrated in Section 5 for establishing the fmp for logics obtained by fibring the logics with fmp discussed in Section 3.
Preliminaries on graph-theoretic fibring
Signatures and interpretation structures of logics are seen as m-graphs in the graph-theoretic account of logics and their fibrings proposed in [30, 31] .
An m-graph, is a tuple G = (V, E, src, trg) such that V is a set (of vertexes or nodes), E is a set (of m-edges), src : E → V + and trg : E → V are maps (the source and the target, respectively), where, as usual, V + denotes the set of all finite non-empty sequences of V . We may write e : s → v or e ∈ G(s, v) when e ∈ E, src(e) = s and trg(e) = v.
Language
A signature is an m-graph Σ = ({π, ♦}, E, src, trg) such that no m-edge has ♦ as target. Node π is the formula sort and node ♦ is the concrete sort. The m-edges play the role of constructors for building formulas. For instance, the connective ¬ is represented by the edge ¬ : π → π. A propositional symbol q is seen as an edge q : ♦ → π.
From an m-graph G we can (canonically) generate a category C(G) with finite products (for details see [30] ). The objects of the category are nonempty sequences of nodes. The morphisms are the paths over the m-graph. We represent the product of nodes s 1 , s 2 as s 1 s 2 . Among the morphisms we have projections of the form p s 1 s 2 i : s 1 s 2 → s i and pairings of the form h 1 , h 2 : w → s 1 s 2 whenever h i : w → s i .
The formulas over Σ are the morphisms of the category C(Σ) with target π. The underlying path identifies the constructors of the formula. We say that a formula is concrete whenever the sort π does not occur in the source, hence the name for node ♦. This notion corresponds to the traditional (settheoretic) notion of language of formulas over Σ. For instance, the concrete formula (¬ q 1 ) ⊃ q 2 , where q 1 and q 2 are propositional symbols, is represented by the morphism: ⊃ • ¬ •q 1 , q 2 : ♦ → π in C(Σ). We may write ⊃(¬(q 1 ), q 2 ) for ⊃ • ¬ •q 1 , q 2 . We say that a formula is schematic if only part of their structure is known (or determined). More concretely, by a schema formula we mean a morphism in C(Σ) with target π and with a source where π occurs. For instance, the morphism
is a schema formula with two schema variables, usually written (
When looking at formulas as morphisms, projections play the role of schema variables. From now on we stick to the categorical notation.
The set of formulas, i.e. the language over Σ, is denoted by L(Σ). The main constructor of a formula is the last edge of the path. The set SF(ϕ) of subformulas of a formula ϕ is inductively defined as follows:
for every n ≥ 1 and i = 1, . . . , n;
• SF(ϕ) = ∪ k j=1 SF(ϕ j )∪{ϕ} assuming that ϕ is c• ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ k where c ∈ E is an edge.
we have:
We denote by Σ n the set of all the n-ary constructors, that is, the m-edges from π n to π in signature Σ, and we denote by Σ + n the set of all morphisms from π n to π in category C(Σ). The elements of Σ + n are known as derived constructors of arity n, while the elements of Σ n are called primitive constructors of arity n.
Semantics
For the semantics we need the notion of m-graph morphism. An m-graph morphism h :
An interpretation structure I over a signature Σ is a triple
where G is an m-graph (the operations graph),
The set V of nodes of the operations graph is called the universe of values. Observe that V is partitioned by α: we denote by V v the domain (α v ) −1 (v) of values for each sort v. The elements of V π are the truth values and the element of V ♦ is the concrete value. The elements of the set D are the distinguished truth values. We say that an interpretation structure I is finite whenever V is a finite m-graph, that is, when V π and E are both finite.
Observe that α can be extended to a functor from C(G ) to C(Σ), mapping projections to projections. We refer to this functor also as α.
In order to prove our main result, we need to introduce some notions related with local satisfaction by a path and global satisfaction by a set of paths.
Let ϕ : π n ♦ m → π where n > 0 and m ≥ 0 be a schema formula and I an interpretation structure both over signature Σ. We say that w : u 1 . . . u n m → d in C(G ) is a path for ϕ in I if w ∈ α −1 (ϕ). When w is a path for ϕ in I and its target is in D we write I, w ϕ and say that path w of I satisfies formula ϕ. Given a set W of paths for ϕ in I, we say that ϕ is W -path satisfiable in I, denoted by
whenever there exists a path w ∈ W such that I, w ϕ. We say that W of I satisfies ϕ, denoted by I, W ∀ ϕ or, simply, by
if I, w ϕ for every path w ∈ W . Finally, we say that W of I falsifies ϕ whenever I, W ϕ. We say that ϕ is path satisfiable in I, denoted by
whenever I, α −1 (ϕ) ∃ ϕ. We say that I satisfies ϕ, denoted by I ∀ ϕ or simply, as usual, by I ϕ, if I, α −1 (ϕ) ϕ. Finally, we say that I falsifies ϕ whenever I ϕ. The denotation of a formula ϕ over I is
In the sequel we also need the following notions and notations concerning paths with selected sources for a given schema formula. Given a formula ϕ over Σ and s a sequence of values, we denote by W I sϕ the set of all paths for ϕ with source s in I. Then s is said to be a socket for ϕ in I. Moreover, we denote by W I ϕ the set of all paths for ϕ whenever ϕ is a formula but not a schema formula. Finally, given a path w for ϕ and a subformula δ of ϕ, we denote by w |δ the subpath of w such that α(w |δ ) = δ.
In order to deal with logics, we need to work with classes of interpretation structures over the same signature. An interpretation system is a pair (Σ, I) where Σ is a signature and I is a class of interpretation structures over Σ.
A formula ϕ is falsifiable in an interpretation system (Σ, I) if there is I ∈ I such that I falsifies ϕ.
Fibring of interpretation systems
For introducing the notion of constrained fibring (sharing some constructors), it is convenient to make use of signature morphisms for specifying which symbols are to be shared. As expected, by a signature morphism we understand an m-graph morphism with the identity map on {π, ♦} as the vertex component.
But let us start first with the notion of unconstrained fibring (no constructor is shared). At the signature level, unconstrained fibring amounts to the disjoint union of the two given signatures. In the category of signatures introduced in [31] , this construction is a co-product. Let Σ 1 and Σ 2 be signatures. Their unconstrained fibring or disjoint fibring, denoted by
is the signature ({π, ♦}, E, src, trg) endowed with injections i 1 and i 2 such that:
• src and trg are such that src • i e j = src j and trg • i e j = trg j . At the semantic level things are a bit more involved even in the case of unconstrained fibring. Let (Σ 1 , I 1 ) and (Σ 2 , I 2 ) be interpretation structures. Given v 1 ∈ V 1 π and v 2 ∈ V 2 π , we say that v 1 and v 2 agree, written v 1 ≈ v 2 , if they are both distinguished or both non distinguished. This notion is pointwise extended to sequences of the same length. The unconstrained fibring or disjoint fibring of interpretation structures (Σ 1 , I 1 ) and (Σ 2 , I 2 ), denoted by
is the co-product of (Σ 1 , I 1 ) and (Σ 2 , I 2 ) in the category of interpretation structures introduced in [31] . More concretely, it is the interpretation structure (Σ 1 Σ 2 , I 1 I 2 ) where I 1 I 2 = ((V , E , src , trg ), α, D) with:
• E is composed of
-each i e 2 (e 2 ) u ,v ,e 2 with e 2 ∈ E 2 , u ∈ V 1 + , v ∈ V 1 , e 2 ∈ E 2 such that e 2 = α e 2 (e 2 ) u ≈ src 2 (e 2 ) and v ≈ trg 2 (e 2 );
• src is such that
• trg is such that
• α is such that
2 (e 2 ) u ,v ,e 2 ) = i e 2 (e 2 );
It is worthwhile to comment upon the nature of the above construction. The unconstrained fibring of two interpretation structures is roughly their Cartesian product, although presented as a co-product in order to follow the combination at the signature level where it is a disjoint union. Clearly, the set V of the vertexes of G is roughly the Cartesian product of V 1 and V 2 (respecting typing and distinguishedness). Less obviously, the set E of the edges of G also has a product nature. In this case the edges of G 1 are paired with all compatible 'mute' edges in G 2 and vice versa. By a 'mute' edge we mean a virtual edge that is not mapped to the signature. The relevance of this notion suggests the use of partial abstraction functions instead of abstraction maps, partial on the edge component, but the categorical development of this idea is outside the scope of this paper.
In the case of constrained fibring (when some constructors are shared), we use signature morphisms for specifying which symbols are to be shared. Let h 1 : Σ 0 → Σ 1 and h 2 : Σ 0 → Σ 2 be injective signature morphisms. Given such a source diagram, we say that constructors e 1 and e 2 are shared if there is a constructor e in Σ 0 such that e 1 = h e 1 (e) and e 2 = h e 2 (e). Furthermore, we say that Σ 1 and Σ 2 share Σ 0 via h 1 and h 2 .
The constrained fibring of signatures Σ 1 and Σ 2 sharing Σ 0 via h 1 and h 2 , denoted by
is the target of the push-out of h 1 and h 2 . Equivalently, it is the target of the co-equalizer
More concretely, it is the signature ({π, ♦}, E * , src * , trg * ) with:
• src * and trg * are such that src * • i e j = src j and trg * • i e j = trg j .
The constrained fibring of interpretation structures (Σ 1 , I 1 ) and (Σ 2 , I 2 ) sharing Σ 0 via h 1 and h 2 , denoted by
is the co-Cartesian lifting by the forgetful functor (from the category of interpretation structures to the category of signatures) of q on the interpretation structure
More concretely, it is the interpretation structure (Σ 1
• E * is composed of
-each i e 1 (h e 1 (e)) e 1 ,e 2 with e ∈ E 0 , e 1 ∈ E 1 , e 2 ∈ E 2 such that α e 1 (e 1 ) = h e 1 (e) and α e 2 (e 2 ) = h e 2 (e) src 1 (e 1 ) ≈ src 2 (e 2 ) and trg 1 (e 1 ) ≈ trg 2 (e 2 );
• src * is such that
• trg * is such that
• α * is such that
2 (e 2 ) u ,v ,e 2 ) = i e 2 (e 2 ) α * e (i e 1 (h e 1 (e)) e 1 ,e 2 ) = i e 1 (h e 1 (e));
It is worthwhile to notice that operation edges mapped to a shared constructor are paired only with the operation edges of the other graph mapped to that shared constructor. Only the operation edges that are mapped to unshared constructors are paired with the 'mute' edges of the other graph.
Observe also that if (Σ 1 , I 1 ) and (Σ 2 , I 2 ) are both finite then so is their (unconstrained or constrained) fibring.
Contrarily to previous approaches to fibring, the graph-theoretic account provides very simple notions of unconstrained and constrained fibring of interpretation systems, once these notions are established for interpretation structures. The unconstrained fibring of interpretation systems (Σ 1 , I 1 ) and (
is the interpretation system (Σ 1 Σ 2 , I 1 I 2 ) where:
The constrained fibring of (Σ 1 , I 1 ) and (Σ 2 , I 2 ) sharing Σ 0 via h 1 and h 2 , denoted by (Σ 1 , I 1 )
is the interpretation system (Σ 1
I 2 ) where:
Finite model property
An interpretation system (Σ, I) is said to have the finite model property, abbreviated by fmp, if for every formula ϕ falsifiable in (Σ, I) there is a finite interpretation J in I such that J falsifies ϕ. The next section is dedicated to proving a sufficient condition for preservation of the fmp by fibring. Here, we introduce a couple of useful notions and provide graph-theoretic accounts of logics with fmp that are used in the sequel for illustration purposes. An interpretation system (Σ, I) is said to have strong negation if there is either a primitive or a derived unary constructor ¬ : π → π such that, for every interpretation structure I in I:
whenever ϕ is a schema formula and s is a socket for it;
An interpretation system (Σ, I) is said to have disjunction if there is either a primitive or a derived binary constructor ∨ : ππ → π such that I ∨(ϕ 1 , ϕ 2 ) iff I ϕ 1 and I ϕ 2 for every interpretation structure I in I. The following result is used later on.
Proposition 3.1 An interpretation system (Σ, I) with disjunction has the fmp iff, for any finite set of formulas {ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ n }, if there is I in I such that I ϕ i for i = 1, . . . , n then there is a finite J in I such that J ϕ i for i = 1, . . . , n.
Modal logic
The first example concerns normal modal logic (for details see [10] and [6] ) endowed with semantics given by modal algebras. Let Π 1 be a set of propositional symbols. Consider the modal signature Σ 1 with the following m-edges:
• ⊃ 1 : ππ → π;
Let A = (A, , , −, ⊥, , ) be a modal algebra (see [20, 21] and also [10] for a more recent presentation and completeness proofs) for a normal modal logic ML, either K or an enrichment of K, with signature Σ 1 , and v a valuation over the algebra (that is, a map from Π 1 to A). The (graph-theoretic) interpretation structure I 1 (A, v) = (G 1 , α 1 , D 1 ) over Σ 1 induced by A and v is as follows:
• G is such that:
-E 1 is composed by the following edges:
for each a 1 and a 2 in A; * 1a : a → a for each a in A.
• α : G → G is such that:
-α e 1 ( a ) = 1 .
•
It is not hard to prove the following result, where by A, v ϕ we mean that the modal algebra A and the valuation v satisfy ϕ.
The (graph-theoretic) interpretation system for modal logic ML is the pair composed by the signature Σ 1 and the class I 1 of the interpretation structures induced by the modal algebras for ML and the valuations over them. It is straightforward to verify that the following results hold. Proposition 3.3 Let ϕ be a modal formula. Then, ϕ is a theorem of ML iff I ϕ for every I ∈ I 1 .
Proof: Since every normal modal logic is complete with respect to the algebraic semantics (see Theorems 7.2 and 7.43 of [10] ) we conclude that I ϕ for every I ∈ I 1 . QED Proposition 3.4 If modal logic ML has the fmp with respect to the algebraic semantics then (Σ 1 , I 1 ) also has the fmp.
It should be stressed that a normal modal logic has the fmp with respect to the algebraic semantics iff it has the fmp with respect to Kripke frames (the interested reader can see Theorem 17 of [20] where the correspondence between finite Kripke frames and finite modal algebras is established). Thus, the result also holds when we consider modal logic ML endowed with Kripke semantics.
These results are easily extended to multimodal logics. Later on, we shall need to work with bimodal logics for dealing with fusions of (mono)modal logics.
Paraconsistent logic
Consider now the paraconsistent logic mbC (see [9] ). Let Π 2 be a set of propositional symbols. The mbC signature Σ 2 has the following m-edges 2 :
Let M = (T, D, O) be the non deterministic matrix for mbC, where T = {t, I, f }, D = {t, I} and O is the set of three-valued truth-tables for the connectives (for details see [4] ). We refrain from giving these truth-tables, but the reader will be able to recover them from the graph-theoretic denotation of the connectives provided below. Let v : Π 2 → T be a map. The interpretation structure I 2 (v) = (G 2 , α 2 , D 2 ) over Σ 2 induced by v is as follows:
• G 2 is such that:
• α 2 : G → G is such that:
The interpretation system for paraconsistent logic mbC is the pair composed by the signature Σ 2 and the class I 2 of all interpretation structures I 2 (v) for every map v : Π 2 → T .
Observe that in this case, it is possible to have in I 2 (v) more than one path mapped by α 2 into the same formula. For instance, assuming that p 2 : → I, the paths ¬ II p 2 and ¬ It p 2 are both denotations of ¬ p 2 .
In order to prove that mbC is weakly sound and complete for (Σ 2 , I 2 ), we need to state a previous result. Let v : L(Σ 2 ) → T be a legal valuation over M (see [4] ). We will denote byv : Π 2 → T the restriction of v to the set Π 2 . By the very definition of (Σ 2 , I 2 ) and M, it is not hard to prove the following result:
Using this and the soundness and completeness of mbC with respect to the non deterministic semantics M we can prove that: Proposition 3.6 ϕ is a theorem of mbC iff ϕ is valid in I 2 .
Proof:
, and so ϕ is not valid in M. Since mbC is sound with respect to the non deterministic semantics M, it follows that ϕ is not a theorem of mbC. Conversely, suppose that ϕ is not a theorem of mbC. Then, by completeness of mbC with respect to the non deterministic semantics M, there is some legal
it follows that I 2 (v) ϕ and so ϕ is not valid in I 2 . QED Proposition 3.7 The interpretation system (Σ 2 , I 2 ) has the fmp.
The result above is an immediate consequence of the fact that mbC has the fmp with respect to the three-valued nondeterministic semantics. This fact is an immediate corollary of the lemma of absent propositional symbols that is known to hold in mbC (see [4] ).
Deontic logic
Consider now the deontic logics DPM (see [15] ). These are in fact two logics DPM.1 and DPM.2 having the same kind of neighborhood semantics but each with specific properties. From this point on, we use DPM to refer to any of them because they behave in an analogous way for the properties we have in mind.
Let F = (W, O) be a neighborhood frame for DPM where W is a non-empty set and O = {O w } w∈W is a family where O w ⊆ ℘W . Let v be a valuation in F, that is, a map from Π 3 to ℘W . The interpretation structure I 3 (F, v) = (G 3 , α 3 , D 3 ) over Σ 1 induced by v is as follows:
• G 3 is such that:
-E is composed of the following m-edges:
• α 3 : G → G is such that:
It is not hard to prove the following result, where by F, v ϕ we mean that the denotation [ 
The (graph-theoretic) interpretation system for deontic logics DPM is the pair composed by the signature Σ 3 and the class I 3 of the interpretation structures induced by the neighborhood frames for DPM and the valuations over them. Using the completeness of DPM with respect to the neighborhood semantics F, the following result holds: Proposition 3.9 Formula ϕ is a theorem of DPM iff I ϕ for every I ∈ I 3 .
The logics DPM have the fmp with respect to the neighborhood semantics (see, for instance, [15] ). Then, the following result holds: Proposition 3.10 The interpretation system (Σ 3 , I 3 ) also has the fmp.
Fragment of linear logic
Consider now the HL fragment (see [3] ) of linear logic (introduced in [14] ), including as primitives only the additive conjunction, the multiplicative negation, the multiplicative implication and the multiplicative disjunction.
Let Π 4 be a set of propositional symbols. The HL signature Σ 4 is a m-graph with sorts π and ♦ and the following m-edges:
Let A = (A, , , −, +, 0) be a *-autonomous lattice (see [27, 28] ) and let v be a valuation over the algebra (that is, a map from Π 4 to A). That is, A is such that:
• (A, +, 0) is an Abelian monoid;
• (A, −, , ) is an involutive lattice;
where ≤ is the order induced by the lattice.
The interpretation structure I 4 (A, v) = (G 4 , α 4 , D 4 ) over Σ 4 induced by A and v is as follows:
-E 4 is composed by the following edges: * p 4 : → v(p 4 ) for p 4 ∈ Π 4 ; * ¬ a : a → −a for each a in A; * ⊃ a 1 a 2 : a 1 a 2 → ((−a 1 ) + a 2 ) for each a 1 and a 2 in A; * ∧ a 1 a 2 : a 1 a 2 → a 1 a 2 for each a 1 , a 2 in A; * + a 1 a 2 : a 1 + a 2 for each a 1 , a 2 in A.
• α 4 : G → G is such that:
• D 4 = { }.
It is straightforward to verify that the following results hold where by A, v ϕ we mean that the *-autonomous algebra and the valuation satisfy ϕ.
The (graph-theoretic) interpretation system for the HL logic is the pair composed by the signature Σ 4 and the class I 4 of the interpretation structures induced by the *-autonomous algebras for HL and the valuations over them. Hence, using the completeness of HL as proved in [3] with respect to the algebraic semantics it follows: Proposition 3.12 Formula ϕ is a theorem of HL iff I ϕ for any I ∈ I 4 .
The logic HL has the fmp with respect to the phase semantics [19] . Since, HL is complete with respect to both phase and * -autonomous lattice semantics (see [3] ) we conclude that HL has the finite model property with respect to * -autonomous lattice semantics.
Proposition 3.13
The interpretation system (Σ 4 , I 4 ) has the fmp.
Preservation of fmp
The problem can be stated as follows. Assume that we have two interpretation systems (Σ 1 , I 1 ) and (Σ 2 , I 2 ) that have the fmp. We will establish a sufficient condition for the interpretation system (Σ 1 , Σ 1 , I 1 I 2 ) to have the fmp. We need some preliminary notions and results. We start by defining an encoding of each formula in Σ 1 Σ 2 in either a formula in Σ 1 or a formula in Σ 2 using projections. The encoding map
is inductively as follows:
. . , ϕ n , assuming that:
-u j is a sequence of sorts for j = 1, . . . , n;
is defined in a similar way.
Example 4.1 Let γ be the formula
be the set of all subformulas of ϕ whose main constructor is in Σ i . Then SF(ϕ) = SF 1 (ϕ) ∪ SF 2 (ϕ). For each ψ ∈ SF(ϕ) and i = 1, 2, we denote by ψ i the formula τ i (ψ). The next result says that from a path for a formula in Σ 1 Σ 2 it is possible to extract a path for the encoding in Σ i of each of its subformulas preserving the satisfaction of the subformula, for i = 1, 2.
Lemma 4.2 Let ϕ ∈ L(Σ 1 Σ 2 ), I 1 ∈ I 1 , I 2 ∈ I 2 and w a path in I 1 I 2 such that α(w) = ϕ. Then for each ψ ∈ SF i (ϕ) and i = 1, 2 there a path w i ψ in I i such that:
• If trg(w | ψ ) = (a 1 , a 2 ) then trg 1 (w 1 ψ ) = a 1 and trg 2 (w 2 ψ ) = a 2 .
Proof:
Let ψ be a subformula of ϕ. We prove the result by induction on the structure of ψ.
Base case: ψ is e : ♦ → π ∈ E 1 . Then ψ 1 is e and ψ 2 is id π . Assume that w |e : → (a 1 , a 2 ). Take w 1 ψ : → a 1 and w 2 ψ = id a 2 . Then
and
and a 2 ∈ D 2 iff I 1 , w 1 e and I 2 , w 2 p π 1 . Induction step: ψ is e • ψ 1 , . . . , ψ k . Then, by the induction hypothesis, there are paths w 1 ψ j and w 2 ψ j such that, for every j = 1, . . . , k:
• if trg(ψ j ) = (a 1j , a 2j ) then trg 1 (w 1 ψ j ) = a 1j and trg 2 (w 2
Hence,
Assume that w | ψ : → (a 1 , a 2 ). Then edge e such that α(e ) = e is e : (a 11 , a 21 ) . . . (a 1n , a 2n ) → (a 1 , a 2 ). Assuming that e ∈ E 1 then there is e 1 : a 11 . . . a 1n → a 1 in I 1 such that α 1 (e 1 ) = e. Take
assuming that src(w 1
Moreover,
The proof is similar when e ∈ E 2 . QED Given a formula ϕ ∈ L(Σ 1 Σ 2 ) with main constructor in E 1 , the sequence
of its decodings is inductively defined as follows:
. . , j are the projections in δ k with target π;
-there exists a subformula γ i of ϕ, for i = 1, . . . , j, such that:
We say that δ k+1 is the direct decoding of
Observe that each decoding is a formula in Σ 1 Σ 2 and, moreover,
We need some notation. Given a path w 1 in I 1 we denote by
the quasi-path in I 1 I 2 obtained from w 1 as follows:
• for each edge e : u 1 . . . u k → u in the operation graph of I 1 we add an edge e : (u 1 ,
each ? i has to be a distinguished truth value whenever u i is distinguished and not distinguished otherwise,
? has to be a distinguished truth value whenever u is distinguished and not distinguished otherwise, and each ? i has to be the concrete value whenever u i is the concrete value;
• for each projection p
It is a quasi-path since the sources and the targets of the morphisms are not fully defined. Analogously, the quasi-path ?w 2 in I 1 I 2 is defined from a path w 2 in I 2 .
The following result is somehow the reverse of Lemma 4.2. It states how to get a path for a formula out of the paths of the encodings of its subformulas.
• there is a path w ψ i in I i for i = 1, 2;
Then there is a path w ϕ in I 1 I 2 such that α(w ϕ ) = ϕ and
where i = 1 if the main constructor of ϕ is in E 1 and i = 2 otherwise.
Assume without loss of generality that the main constructor of ϕ is in E 1 . Let δ 0 , . . . , δ m be the sequence of decodings of ϕ. Consider the sequence of quasi-paths {qw δ k } k=1,...,m in I 1 I 2 inductively defined as follows:
• qw δ 0 = w ϕ 1 ?;
. . , j are the projections in qw δ k ;
-there exists a subformula ψ i of ϕ, for i = 1, . . . , j, such that:
and similarly for (qw
Note that qw δ k is a quasi-path since the definition of the vertexes is yet to be completed. Moreover, (?qw ψ 2 i ) + is well defined since, by hypothesis,
Define the sequence of paths Observe that w δ k is a path for δ k and, moreover, w δm is a path for ϕ.
We now show that
Base case: The thesis follows directly from the choice of w δ 0 .
Induction step: Assume that
Thus, the result holds for ϕ since ϕ 1 is δ m . QED
The idea behind the preservation of the fmp in the present context is as follows. Suppose that I ϕ where I is in I 1 I 2 . By definition of fibring, I = I 1 I 2 for some I 1 ∈ I 1 and I 2 ∈ I 2 . Then we are able to find formulas ϕ 1 ∈ Σ 1 and ϕ 2 ∈ Σ 2 such that I 1 ϕ 1 and I 2 ϕ 2 . The fmp property for I 1 and I 2 introduces finite interpretation structures J 1 ∈ I 1 and J 2 ∈ I 2 such that J 1 ϕ 1 and J 2 ϕ 2 and so J 1 J 2 ϕ.
Theorem 4.5 Let (Σ i , I i ) be an interpretation system with disjunction ∨ i and strong negation ¬ i for i = 1, 2. Then (Σ 1 , I 1 ) (Σ 2 , I 2 ) has the fmp provided that both (Σ 1 , I 1 ) and (Σ 2 , I 2 ) have the fmp.
Let ϕ be a formula in L(Σ 1 Σ 2 ) and I ∈ I 1 I 2 an interpretation structure over Σ 1 Σ 2 such that I ϕ. Assume, without loss of generality, that the main constructor in ϕ belongs to Σ 1 . Let I 1 ∈ I 1 and I 2 ∈ I 2 be such that I = I 1 I 2 . Then there is a path w in I 1 I 2 such that:
• α(w) = ϕ;
That is, I, w ϕ. Hence, by Lemma 4.2, for each ψ ∈ SF i (ϕ), i = 1, 2, of ϕ there a path w i ψ in I i such that:
Letψ i be defined as follows:
where ¬ i is the strong negation of (Σ i , I i ) for i = 1, 2. Then Hence, by Proposition 3.1 and the fact that (Σ i , I i ) has the fmp, there is a finite interpretation structure J = J 1 J 2 ∈ I 1 I 2 such that J i ψ i , for every ψ ∈ SF(ϕ) and i = 1, 2.
That is, there is a path w ψi for each ψ ∈ SF(ϕ), such that
with i = 1, 2. Since (Σ i , I i ) has strong negation, there is a path w ψ i with the same socket for each ψ ∈ SF(ϕ) withψ i = ¬ i ψ i such that
Therefore,
for every ψ ∈ SF(ϕ) and i = 1, 2. In particular
Thus, by Lemma 4.4, we conclude that there is a path w ϕ such that
where i = 1 if the main constructor of ϕ is in E 1 and i = 2 otherwise. Since
We now give a detailed example of the construction in the proof of Theorem 4.5.
Example 4.6 Let ϕ be the mixed formula
where the subscript i refers to symbols from the signature Σ i for i = 1, 2. Suppose that I = I 1 I 2 is such that I ϕ.
Consider a path w in I such that I, w ϕ. Then w has the form described in Figure 1 , where we use for the denotation of a constructor the same name as for the constructor (we use graphical notation for paths in order to make easier the building process):
(a) Encoding of all formulas in SF 1 (ϕ) and SF 2 (ϕ). In Figure 7 , we depict the quasi-path qw δ 1 for
Let w δ 1 be a path obtained from qw δ 1 by filling in ? with arbitrary truth values in such a way that in each pair both are distinguished or both are not distinguished. Then
2 ). Continuing with this process we obtain a path for ϕ in J 1 J 2 whose target is a non-distinguished truth value, as required. Theorem 4.5 can be extended to constrained fibring (with some sharing of constructors). Thus, we have the following result. Theorem 4.7 Let (Σ i , I i ) be an interpretation system with disjunction ∨ i and strong negation ¬ i for i = 1, 2 and let h i : Σ 0 → Σ i be a signature morphisms for i = 1, 2. Then (Σ 1 , I 1 ) I 2 ) has the fmp provided that both (Σ 1 , I 1 ) and (Σ 2 , I 2 ) have the fmp.
Examples
In this section, we discuss preservation of the fmp by several combinations of the logics described in Section 3. Theorem 4.5 can be applied in all these cases because the logics at hand have both disjunction and strong negation.
Modal paraconsistent logic
Herein, we combine a normal modal logic ML, as described in Subsection 3.1, with the paraconsistent logic mbC, as introduced in Subsection 3.2 (the importance of combining modal logics with paraconsistent logics is discussed in [24] ).
Proposition 5.1 A modal paraconsistent logic (Σ 1 , I 1 ) (Σ 2 , I 2 ) has the finite model property, providing that modal logic ML has the fmp.
Proof: The interpretation system (Σ 1 , I 1 ) has strong negation and disjunction. Additionally, it is possible to define a strong negation as a derived constructor in mbC as follows:
On the other hand, ∨ 2 is a disjunction in our sense. Hence (Σ 2 , I 2 ) also has strong negation and disjunction. Therefore, by Theorem 4.5, (Σ 1 , I 1 ) (Σ 2 , I 2 ) has the finite model property. QED Hence ML can be instantiated with any normal modal logic with the fmp (see [7, 16] for several examples). But, it is worthwhile to point out that, as shown in [23, 11] , not all normal logics have the fmp. A Hilbert calculus can be given for modal paraconsistent logic by taking the axioms and the rules of both ML and mbC. Then, the following results hold.
Corollary 5.2
The modal paraconsistent logic (Σ 1 , I 1 ) (Σ 2 , I 2 ) is decidable, providing that the modal logic (Σ 1 , I 1 ) has the fmp.
Proposition 5.3
The modal paraconsistent logic (Σ 1 , I 1 ) (Σ 2 , I 2 ) is weakly complete, assuming that ML is weakly complete.
Proof: By Theorem 7.7 of [31] we conclude the weak completeness by observing that the canonical model of ML is in I 1 (the Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra -see Section 5.2 of [6] ) and the canonical model of mbC is in I 2 (the latter is an easy consequence of the canonical model in the proof in [4] and Proposition 3.5). QED
Deontic paraconsistent logic
Consider now the combination of the paraconsistent logic mbC, as introduced in Subsection 3.2, with the deontic logic DPM, as described in Subsection 3.3.
Proposition 5.4
The deontic paraconsistent logic (Σ 2 , I 2 ) (Σ 3 , I 3 ) has the finite model property.
Proof: It is clear from the definition that (Σ 3 , I 3 ) has strong negation ¬ 1 and disjunction ∨ 1 . On the other hand, (Σ 2 , I 2 ) also has strong negation and disjunction as shown in the proof of Proposition 5.1. Hence, by Theorem 4.5, (Σ 2 , I 2 ) (Σ 3 , I 3 ) has the finite model property. QED
Fusion of normal modal logics
Let ML a and ML b be two normal modal logics endowed with algebraic semantics. Let (Σ 1 , I a 1 ) and (Σ 1 , I b 1 ) be interpretation systems, as described in Subsection 3.1, for ML a and ML b , respectively. Furthermore, let ML a ⊕ ML b be the fusion of ML a and ML b , a bimodal logic. Let (Σ, I) = (Σ 1 , I a 1 ) ⊕ (Σ 1 , I b 1 ) be the interpretation system induced by ML a ⊕ ML b as hinted in Subsection 3.1. Satisfaction in (Σ, I) coincides with satisfaction in ML a ⊕ ML b (the multimodal variant of Proposition 3.2). Thanks to [18] we know that if ML a and ML b have the fmp then so has their fusion. We recover now this result as a special case of the transference of fmp by fibring.
To this end, observe first that the signature Σ of the fusion coincides with Σ 1 Σ 0 h a ,h b Σ 1 with h a : Σ 0 → Σ 1 and h b : Σ 0 → Σ 1 where Σ 0 is the signature with edges p : ♦ → π, ¬ : π → π and ⊃ : ππ → π. Clearly, the propositional symbols and connectives are shared while we keep the two boxes apart, as intended in fusion.
Moreover, it is straightforward to verify that satisfaction in (Σ, I) coincides with satisfaction in (Σ 1 , I a 1 )
. In consequence, we have:
Proposition 5.12 The fusion ML a ⊕ ML b has the finite model property, provided that both ML a and ML b have the fmp.
Proof: Again we apply Theorem 4.5 since modal logics have both disjunction and strong negation and fusion coincides satisfaction-wise with the fibring described above. QED Hence, as expected, the transference of fmp by fibring subsumes the preservation of fmp by fusion of modal logics.
Outlook
In this paper, we established sufficient conditions for the preservation by fibring of the finite model property for a large class of logics. We took advantage of a novel feature of the graph-theoretic semantics of fibring proposed in [31] : every model of the logic obtained by fibring (Σ 1 , I 1 ) and (Σ 2 , I 2 ) is, roughly speaking, the Cartesian product of a model of I 1 and a model of I 2 . Observe also that the graph-theoretic account of fibring encompasses a much wider universe of logics, including paraconsistency and substructurality, thanks to using an abstraction map from the model to the language instead of the traditional interpretation map from the language to the model.
Our preservation result of the finite model property covers a wide class of logics: we require only the additional assumption of availability of disjunction and strong negation (either primitive or as abbreviations). It should be noted that intuitionistic logic does not satisfy these requirements. It is our intention to investigate preservation of the fmp when one of the logics is intuitionistic logic by exploring the encoding of intuitionistic logic in the S4 modal logic.
